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by Simon Jäger
This dissertation consists of three independent essays in
labor and public economics. Chapter 1, the main chapter,
presents evidence on the substitutability between workers
within a firm, and between incumbent workers and outsiders, which matter for understanding the operation of internal
labor markets and the consequences of worker turnover.
To assess the substitutability of workers, I estimate how
exogenous worker exits affect a firm’s demand for incumbent
workers and new hires. Using matched employer-employee
data based on the universe of German social security records,
I analyze the effects of 34,000 unexpected worker deaths and
show that these worker exits on average raise the remaining workers’ wages and retention probabilities for a period
of several years. These findings are difficult to reconcile
with frictionless labor markets and perfect substitutability
between incumbent workers and outsiders. The average
effect masks substantial heterogeneity: coworkers in the
same occupation as the deceased see positive wage effects;
coworkers in other occupations instead experience wage
decreases when a high-skilled worker or manager dies. Thus,
coworkers in the same occupation appear to be substitutes,
while high-skilled workers and managers appear to be
complements to coworkers in other occupations. Finally,
when the external labor market in the deceased’s occupation
is thin, incumbents’ wages respond more and external hiring
responds less to a worker death. The results suggest that thin
external markets for skills lead to higher firm-specificity of
human capital and lower replaceability of incumbents.
Chapter 2, which is joint work with Peter Ganong,
proposes a permutation test for the Regression Kink (RK)
design—an increasingly popular empirical method for causal
inference. Analogous to the Regression Discontinuity design,
which evaluates discontinuous changes in the level of an
outcome variable with respect to the running variable at a
point at which the level of a policy changes, the RK design
evaluates discontinuous changes in the slope of an outcome
variable with respect to the running variable at a kink point
at which the slope of a policy with respect to the running
variable changes. Using simulation studies based on data
from existing RK designs, we document empirically that the
statistical significance of RK estimators based on conventional standard errors can be spurious. In the simulations,
false positives arise as a consequence of nonlinearities in
the underlying relationship between the outcome and the
assignment variable. As a complement to standard RK inference, we propose that researchers construct a distribution of
placebo estimates in regions with and without a policy kink
and use this distribution to gauge statistical significance.
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Under the assumption that the location of the kink point is
random, this permutation test has exact size in finite samples
for testing a sharp null hypothesis of no effect of the policy
on the outcome. We document using simulations that our
method improves on the size of standard approaches.
Chapter 3, which is joint work with Johannes Abeler and
published in Abeler and Jäger (2015), analyzes a laboratory
experiment to study how tax complexity affects people’s
reactions to tax changes. In the experiment, subjects work for
a piece rate and face taxes. One treatment features a simple
tax system, the other is complex. The payoff-maximizing
output level and the incentives around this optimum are,
however, identical across treatments. We introduce the same
sequence of additional taxes in both treatments. Subjects in
the complex treatment underreact to new taxes; some ignore
new taxes entirely. The underreaction is stronger for subjects
with lower cognitive ability. Contrary to predictions from
models of rational inattention, subjects are equally likely to
ignore large or small incentive changes.
Summary of Chapter 1: How Substitutable Are Workers?
Evidence from Worker Deaths
The fluidity of labor markets depends on the ease with
which the two sides of the market can switch trading partners: workers finding alternative employment suitable for
their skills and firms finding adequate substitutes for their
current workers. An extensive body of empirical literature sheds light on the workers’ perspective and finds that
workers who are displaced from their jobs suffer persistent
earnings losses—consistent with Becker’s (1962) idea that
human capital has firm-specific components.1 However,
much less is known about the other side of the market: firms’
ability to find substitutes for their workers, in particular ones
with specific human capital. When a worker leaves a firm,
how easily can the firm replace the worker externally through
hiring, and how do such worker exits affect the firm’s
demand for its remaining workers? Several debates—ranging
from the role of labor pooling as a source of agglomeration
(Marshall 1890) to the importance of intrafirm bargaining
(Stole and Zwiebel 1996a,b)—hinge directly on the answer
to this question.
I offer an empirical answer to this question by estimating the effects of exogenous worker exits on hiring, and on
the firm’s demand for the labor of the remaining workers. I
then use the results to adjudicate between different models
of the labor market—in particular, different assumptions
about the substitutability of workers. I illustrate the intuition
underlying my approach in a simple conceptual framework
that demonstrates how different assumptions about worker
substitutability alter the predictions for the sign and magnitude of the effects of worker exits. The competitive labor
market model assumes that outside workers are perfect
substitutes for incumbent workers and thus predicts that the

2016 Dissertation Summaries

effect of worker exits on the firm’s labor demand for the
remaining insiders is zero: the firm can simply hire a suitable
new worker in response to a worker exit so that its demand
for the labor of the remaining workers remains unchanged.
In contrast, when outsiders are only imperfect substitutes for
insiders—for instance, because the firm’s production process
relies on specific human capital—worker exits can affect the
firm’s labor demand for incumbent workers. In bargaining
models that incorporate such imperfect substitutability (see,
e.g., Stole and Zwiebel [1996a,b]), the sign of the effect
identifies the substitutability of the exiting worker’s skills
with those of the remaining workers: the firm’s labor demand
rises for substitutes and, in contrast, falls for complements of
the worker who exited.
To test these predictions, I implement a quasi-experimental
research design and estimate the causal effect of unexpected
worker deaths on hiring and on the remaining workers’ wages
and retention rates based on the universe of German Social
Security records.2 In a dynamic difference-in-differences
design, I compare roughly 34,000 small firms that experienced the death of a worker in a given year to a comparison
group of firms with similar characteristics that did not experience a worker death that year. The research design relies on
deaths as a source of variation to circumvent the endogeneity
of worker exits. The sample excludes the deaths of workers
who experienced a hospitalization or longer sickness spell
in the five years before their death in order to exclude deaths
preceded by debilitating diseases. The outcomes in the treatment and comparison group follow parallel trends in the years
prior to the death of a worker in treatment group firms, suggesting that outcomes in comparison group firms can be used
to gauge what would have happened to workers in treatment
group firms in the absence of a worker death.
Based on almost 7 million worker-year observations, I
show that worker deaths affect firms’ demand for the labor
of their remaining workers. On average, incumbent workers in the treatment group experience a highly statistically
significant earnings increase of about 0.6 percent in the
year after the death.3 Over the course of the five years after
the death, the average cumulative effect on the earnings of
all incumbent workers in a treatment group firm is close to
6,000 EUR (2010 CPI), corresponding to about 18 percent
of an average deceased worker’s annual earnings. Moreover,
incumbent workers in the treatment group are more likely to
retain employment at the same firm and are less likely to be
employed at other firms; their probability of (any) employment does not change in response to a worker death. Worker
deaths do not affect incumbents’ working hours at the parttime versus full-time margin.4
In a next step, I leverage the research design to estimate within-firm heterogeneity across occupation and skill
groups and find substantial heterogeneity, shedding light on
the interdependencies between workers and the sources of
frictions in replacing workers. The positive wage effects of
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worker exits are concentrated among incumbent workers in
the same occupation group as the deceased.5 For deaths of
workers in high-skilled occupations, I estimate statistically
significant, negative effects on the wages of incumbent workers in other occupations. Similarly, wage effects on incumbent workers in other occupations are negative in the case of
deaths of managers.6 Turning the focus to measures of human
capital specificity of the deceased, I find evidence suggesting that longer-tenured workers and workers in specialized
occupations are harder to replace with outsiders.7
Since the evidence indicates that worker exits affect firms’
demand for incumbents, my findings are hard to reconcile
with frictionless labor markets and perfect substitutability
between incumbents and outsiders and instead point to a set
of models in which firms face frictions in replacing workers
externally. In particular, the findings accord with Becker’s
(1964) conjecture that firms share rents with workers to keep
workers with specific human capital from quitting.8 The finding of positive wage effects on coworkers in the same occupation as the deceased supports this view, because workers
in the same occupation are arguably closer substitutes than
workers in different occupations and therefore become more
valuable to the firm as a consequence of a coworker exit.
The finding of negative wage effects of deaths of workers in
high-skilled occupations on incumbents in other occupations
indicates imperfect substitutability between high- and lowskilled labor. My findings thereby support a key assumption
of models positing that skilled workers raise the productivity
of other workers at the same firm (see, e.g., Lucas [1978];
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny [1991]; Rosen [1982]), and
constitute firm-level evidence consistent with studies of how
marketwide labor supply shocks—for example, due to immigration or changes in the college graduation rate—affect the
wage structure (see, e.g., Card [2009]; Dustmann, Ludsteck,
and Schönberg [2009]; Goldin and Katz [2008]; and Katz
and Murphy [1992]).9
The validity of my interpretation of the empirical results
as evidence regarding the substitutability of workers depends
on whether alternative mechanisms can account for my findings. I consider three alternative explanations and evaluate
them in light of the evidence: 1) changes in the remaining
workers’ compensating differential for working at the firm,
2) job assignment purely based on seniority, and 3) search
frictions without human capital specificity. None of the
alternative mechanisms matches all of the evidence. The first
alternative explanation, for instance, builds on the hypothesis
that incumbent worker wages may have gone up as a result
of a worker death increasing the compensating differential
for working at the firm—for example, due to decreased
utility of interacting with colleagues or increases in the
perception of job hazards. While such labor supply–driven
explanations could explain why wages increase, they would
simultaneously predict that workers’ probability of staying
with the firm should decrease. The data, however, reject this
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explanation as both wages and the probability of staying
at the firm go up. Therefore, positive shifts in firms’ labor
demand dominate any negative shocks to incumbent workers’ labor supply. Several results are in conflict with the other
alternative explanations. For example, the second explanation posits that workers may be perfect substitutes but rise
through the ranks purely based on seniority. However, this
explanation cannot account for the finding that wage effects
of high-skilled worker deaths are negative. In contrast,
models in which insiders and outsiders as well as high- and
low-skilled workers are imperfect substitutes are consistent
with the evidence.
To shed light on the sources of frictions in replacing
workers, I study heterogeneity by external labor market
conditions and find that firms in thicker markets for specialized skills change incumbent wages by less and hire more
externally in response to a worker death. The investigation
is motivated by Marshall’s (1890) conjecture that firms and
workers in thicker, more agglomerated labor markets face
fewer frictions in finding a suitable match and tests Lazear’s
(2009) theory according to which the specificity of human
capital depends on the thickness of the market.10 I investigate
the role of market thickness by estimating heterogeneity
across labor markets which vary in the relative agglomeration of workers in the deceased’s occupation.11 Wage effects
are smaller in labor markets with a higher concentration of
workers in the relevant occupation. Consistent with a labor
market thickness mechanism, the difference between thick
and thin labor markets is larger for occupations with a high
degree of specialization. Additional evidence shows that
firms in thicker labor markets are more likely to hire a new
worker externally when a worker in a specialized occupation dies. Taken together, my findings support Lazear’s
(2009) theory of firm-specific human capital and suggest that
frictions in replacing workers are larger in thin markets, in
which workers’ skills are more firm-specific.
This paper contributes to several additional strands of
the literature. Its results provide direct evidence supporting
the key assumption of intrafirm bargaining models (Stole
and Zwiebel 1996a,b)—imperfect substitutability between
incumbent workers and outsiders—and thereby resolve an
open debate in the literature.12 By shedding light on the
frictions that firms face in replacing workers externally, my
study adds to a literature—going back to Slichter (1919) and
Oi (1962)—that estimates the costs of worker turnover.13
While this literature focuses on gauging firms’ expenditure
for recruiting, hiring, and training, my research design provides a complementary perspective by providing evidence
on how turnover affects firms’ labor demand for incumbent
workers and by showing that workers are harder to replace
when their human capital is firm-specific. In doing so, my
research design complements the extensive literature that
assesses how firms’ profitability affects wages (see, e.g.,
Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfey 1996; Card, Devicienti,
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and Maida 2013; Dickens and Katz [1987]; Slichter [1950];
and Van Reenen, 1996), as it provides direct evidence for
a mechanism—human capital specificity leading to imperfect substitutability between insiders and outsiders—that
gives rise to such rent sharing. Finally, my research design
provides new evidence for the importance of internal labor
markets (Doeringer and Piore 1971) by showing how
idiosyncratic shocks to firm-specific labor supply—that is,
internal market forces—shape wages.14
Notes
1. See Davis and von Wachter (2011); Dustmann and Meghir
(2005); Farber, Hall, and Pencavel (1993); Gibbons and Katz
(1991); Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993); and Topel
(1991). Additional evidence accords with extensions of
Becker’s model in Gibbons and Waldman (2004) and Lazear
(2009) that can account for occupation, industry, and firm specificity of human capital (see Gathmann and Schönberg 2010;
Gibbons and Katz 1992; Kambourov and Manovskii 2009;
Neal 1995; Nedelkoska, Neffke, and Wiederhold 2015; Parent
2000; and Poletaev and Robinson 2008).
2. The use of deaths as a source of variation builds on previous
work in Azoulay, Wang, and Zivin (2010); Becker and Hvide
(2013); Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon (2006);
Bennedsen et al. (2007); Fadlon and Nielsen (2015); Isen
(2013); Jaravel, Petkova, and Bell (2015); Jones and Olken
(2005); and Oettl (2012).
3. The average firm in my sample has 14.5 employees in the year
before a worker death.
4. Even if in part due to changes in working hours, nonzero wage
effects of worker exits indicate that the firm cannot costlessly
hire perfect replacements for incumbents. The data contain
information on the part-time and full-time status of workers,
but not more fine-grained measures of working hours, such
as overtime. My analysis of treatment effects on the intensive
margin is therefore limited to the part-time versus full-time
margin. I analyze this effect in several samples, including
incumbent workers who were part-time employed at the time
of the worker death, and find no evidence for intensive-margin
effects.
5. In my main specifications, I consider workers in the same onedigit group of the 2010 Classification of Occupations (Klassifikation der Berufe 2010) as being in the same occupation
group and define workers in other occupations as the complement of that group.
6. I classify workers as managers if they work in an occupation
characterized by managerial, planning, and control activities,
such as operation and work scheduling, supply management,
and quality control and assurance.
7. I proxy for specialization with a measure used in Bleakley
and Lin (2012), who classify occupations as relying on more
specific skills when the returns to experience are high, which
can be thought of as capturing the importance of occupationspecific capital (see, e.g., Kambourov and Manovskii [2009]
and Shaw [1984, 1987]).
8. My results provide support for ex post rent sharing. It would in
principle still be possible that workers do not earn ex ante rents
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9.

10.

11.

12.

13.
14.

if labor markets are competitive at the stage when workers
enter firms.
Katz and Murphy (1992), for example, provide evidence that
college- and high school–educated workers are imperfect
substitutes and show that changes in the aggregate supply
of college graduates are associated with in opposite-signed
changes the college premium.
See Marshall (1890, p. 156):
[A] localized industry gains a great advantage
from the fact that it offers a constant market for skill.
Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are
likely to find a good choice of workers with the special
skill which they require; while men seeking employment naturally go to places where there are many
employers who need such skill as theirs and where
therefore it is likely to find a good market. The owner
of an isolated factory, even if he has access to a plentiful supply of general labour, is often put to great shifts
for want of some special skilled labour; and a skilled
workman, when thrown out of employment in it, has no
easy refuge.
Lazear (2009) develops a model in which human capital is a
combination of general skills and becomes more firm-specific
in firms with more idiosyncratic skill requirements compared
to the external market. This view of human capital specificity
contrasts with a dichotomous distinction of purely firm-specific
and purely general skills.
I measure thickness at the 5-digit occupation × commuting
zone level as the share of employment in the relevant occupation in that commuting zone relative to the nationwide share of
employment in that occupation. I then classify 5-digit occupation × commuting zone cells as a thin or thick labor market
based on a median split. As an intuitive example, the labor
market for mechanical engineers in Munich will be described
as thick based on this measure if Munich has a high share of
mechanical engineers relative to the overall share of mechanical engineers in the German labor market.
The canonical intrafirm bargaining model of Stole and Zwiebel
(1996a,b) relies crucially on the assumption that firms face
frictions in replacing their workers externally (see applications
in trade and macroeconomics in, e.g., Acemoglu and Hawkins
[2014] and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding [2010]). Under
the converse assumption that firms can hire perfectly substitutable replacement workers in the external labor market, the key
result of overemployment in Stole and Zwiebel is overturned
(de Fontenay and Gans 2003). Stole and Zwiebel (2003)
themselves note that “empirical work is needed to make a compelling case for one approach over the other” (p. 457). More
recently, Elsby and Michaels (2013) assess that the “empirical
validity of the Stole and Zwiebel bargaining solution has yet to
be assessed.”
See also the overview of estimates of hiring costs in Manning
(2011).
In an influential contribution, Doeringer and Piore (1971)
describe hiring, wage, and career dynamics in internal labor
markets in which the hiring of new workers is limited to
lower-level “ports of entry,” higher-level vacancies are filled
through internal promotions and wages are “shielded from the
direct influences of competitive forces in the external market.”
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For existing tests of internal labor markets see, e.g., Baker,
Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b); Lazear (1992); and Lazear
and Oyer (2004a,b). Relatedly, Bertrand (2004) provides
evidence on the relationship between import competition and
the shielding of wages from external labor market conditions.
A related literature tests empirically between contract and spot
market models of the labor market by estimating the effect of
past unemployment on wages (see, e.g., Beaudry and DiNardo
[1991]). For overviews, see the surveys in Gibbons and Waldman (1999); Lazear and Oyer (2013); Oyer and Scott (2011);
and Waldman (2013).
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